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I. INTRODUCTION
When an important case is appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, interested
observers focus their attention on the substantive principles that they hope the Court
will articulate. Typically, some uncertainty in the law exists — after all, the case
would not be worthy of the Supreme Court’s attention otherwise. But the confusion
reigning in standard of review jurisprudence had reached a level where some
people’s desire for certainty, especially in the mechanics of deference, broke free
from any substantive substrate. Thumb’s second postulate, “An easily-understood,
workable falsehood is more useful than a complex, incomprehensible truth”, held
even more attraction than usual for some of my exasperated law students.
My unscientiﬁc impression is that most lawyers and academic colleagues agree
that Vavilov1 delivers greater certainty in the methodology for applying a “reasonableness” standard of review to questions of law. There is a palpable sense of relief
*

Faculty of Law, and Centre for Criminology & Sociolegal Studies, University of
Toronto. The author was co-counsel to the intervener Canadian Association of Refugee
Lawyers (CARL) in Vavilov. The author’s comments are offered in her academic capacity and
do not necessarily reﬂect the views of CARL. The author thanks an anonymous reviewer for
helpful comments, and Ryan Deshpande for his excellent and efficient editorial assistance.
The author is a fellow of the Trudeau Foundation and the Canadian Institute for Advanced
Research, and thanks both institutions for their ﬁnancial support.
1

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, [2019] S.C.J. No. 65,
2019 SCC 65 (S.C.C.).
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about that. Less consensus exists on the virtues of the new approach, which tilts
toward a more exacting (and therefore less deferential) approach than whatever it
replaced.
Vavilov, of course, does more than that. It affirms that a presumption of deference
applies to all decision-makers to whom the legislator has delegated authority, but
discards expertise as the dominant rationale for that deference. It excludes elements
of administrative decisions subject to statutory appeal from the purview of
deference. It heeds Binnie J.’s advice to euthanize jurisdiction as a distinctive
category of legal issues that warrants non-deferential review. It reiterates the Court’s
past resistance to inconsistency as a justiﬁcation for dispositive judicial intervention.
And it demonstrates in reasonable detail (unlike its predecessor, Dunsmuir2) how to
apply the new reasonableness methodology in the case at bar. The majority holds
that
it is not enough for the outcome of a decision to be justiﬁable. Where reasons for
a decision are required, the decision must also be justiﬁed, by way of those reasons,
by the decision maker to those to whom the decision applies.3

In principle, this should signal an end to the practice of retroﬁtting poorly
motivated outcomes with judicially crafted justiﬁcations.4 Expertise resurfaces in
the application of deference as an attribute that manifests in the quality of reasoning,
and which a deferential court should recognize and respect.
Vavilov’s companion decision, Bell and NFL,5 traces the alternate path of an
administrative decision subject to statutory appeal to the courts and demonstrates
what non-deferential (correctness) review of statutory interpretation looks like.
When I read Vavilov, my relief at the articulation of a pragmatic methodology for
reasonableness review mitigates my principled reservations about other aspects of
the judgment. When I read Bell and NFL, I experience no such relief.
But these are early days, and the actual meaning of the Supreme Court’s revision
of the principles governing substantive review will only be revealed in the recursive
telling and re-telling of Vavilov over the course of judicial reviews and statutory
appeals to come from courts around the country in the years ahead. On its best
2

Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, 2008 SCC 9 (S.C.C.).

3

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, [2019] S.C.J. No. 65,
2019 SCC 65, at para. 86 (S.C.C.) [emphasis in original].
4
But see Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, [2019] S.C.J. No.
65, 2019 SCC 65, at para. 123 (S.C.C.): “There may be other cases in which the
administrative decision maker has not explicitly considered the meaning of a relevant
provision in its reasons, but the reviewing court is able to discern the interpretation adopted
by the decision maker from the record and determine whether that interpretation is
reasonable.”
5
Bell Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), [2019] S.C.J. No. 66, 2019 SCC 66 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Bell and NFL”].
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reading, I would label the majority’s approach to deference on questions of law a
type of enlightened statutory interpretation. This method encourages a reviewing
court to be receptive and respectful toward a more pluralist, textured and situated
approach to ascribing meaning to legal text than traditional techniques of statutory
interpretation might otherwise allow. Though it may be less generous than some
versions of the deference it replaces, it has much to commend it on the majority’s
own account. Indeed, one of the questions left dangling by the majority, and made
stark by the companion case of Bell and NFL, is why a reviewing court should ever
eschew an enlightened approach to statutory interpretation.
II. STRANGE BEDFELLOWS
The administrative state imagined by champions of deference, from CUPE v. New
Brunswick Liquor Corp.6 through to the present, is populated by competent, expert
and dispassionate administrative actors and intelligent judges with enough conﬁdence and reﬂexivity to recognize their strengths and their limitations. In this
ﬁrst-best world, administrative actors and judges are bound through mutual respect
in a shared project of instantiating the rule of law. The corrective of judicial review
does not disappear, but it recedes in importance.
This ﬁrst-best world certainly corresponds to reality for some signiﬁcant
proportion of administrative actors and judges, in some places and at some historical
moments. In the second-best world inhabited by many administrative actors and
judges, however, these estimable characters share space with inexpert or simply
under-resourced decision-makers, and with judges institutionally unable to shake the
conviction that they really are the smartest guys in the room. I believe that these
deviations from the ideal case account for the familiar pathologies in the jurisprudence: judicial abdication in the name of deference, correctness review under the
guise of reasonableness, and a pervasive sense of unpredictability, randomness and
result-oriented analysis.
This gap between the ﬁrst-best and second-best world is key to understanding the
apparent anomaly of Vavilov’s counsel advocating a return to the pre-CUPE world
of muscular judicial review of questions of law. In immigration law, prison law,
income support and ﬁelds broadly described as regulating marginalized populations,
the judicial review narrative did not follow the plotline of sophisticated administrative actors implementing complex and progressive legislative agendas, while
dodging the risk of being thwarted by regressive judicial intervention. Instead, the
subjects of these administrative regimes worried more about decision-makers of
widely varying competence, who were subject to various ﬁscal and political
pressures from inside and outside their institutions, and who operated within a
culture of suspicion toward those over whom they exercised authority. The uneven
quality of decision-making, and the tilt toward statutory interpretations favourable
to the state (and adverse to their clients), made many lawyers in these areas skeptical
6

[1979] S.C.J. No. 45, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 277 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “CUPE”].
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about both the presuppositions and the actual practice of deferential review. Because
the preponderance of judicial reviews were launched by clients denied a remedy, a
beneﬁt, or a status, deferential review typically redounded to the detriment of
applicants.
Given their experience, counsel for marginalized clients believed they had
nothing to lose and something to gain for their clients by advocating for a return to
a more exacting judicial review of questions of law, particularly when the issues
touched on questions of human rights or related vital interests7. In so doing, their
position appeared to converge with resurgent voices inside and outside the judiciary
who promote a model of judicial review that takes literally the inferiority of
“inferior tribunals”, and jealously guards the judiciary as sole guardians of the rule
of law against an unruly administration. The fact that proponents of this model tend
also to embrace conservative or libertarian politics that are broadly inimical to the
interests of marginalized constituencies seems ironic. But this appearance of a
common position among two constituencies at different ends of the political
spectrum is explicable. Advocates for marginalized groups supported stricter
judicial review for contingent and pragmatic reasons. They need not presume a
judiciary that is progressive or inclined toward their clients’ interests. But since their
clients are typically applicants (rather than respondents) on judicial review, less
deferential review would at least offer a more meaningful platform to persuade a
court about the defects of the original decision. In this sense, they arrive at their
position via a different route than those who espouse a principled objection to a
pluralist vision of the rule of law, or an ideological antipathy toward the
redistributive dimensions of the modern administrative state.
III. EXPERTISE: LINKAGES AND FAULT LINES
The main tasks set by the majority judgment in Vavilov were: ﬁrst, to clarify the
basis for selecting the standard of review; and second, to articulate a methodology
for the application of reasonableness to questions of law.8 In Bell and NFL, the
majority demonstrates the obverse, namely the application of a non-deferential
(correctness) standard of review.
1.

Rules of Law
One awkward feature of the majority judgment is that it pastes together two
7

I was co-counsel for the intervener Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers. We did
not advocate for a return to “correctness” for questions of law, although we did support
greater rigour in the methodology of deferential review. See Factum of the Intervener,
Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers, in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) v. Vavilov, [2019] S.C.J. No. 65, 2019 SCC 65 (S.C.C.), online: <https://www.
scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/37748/FM130_Intervener_Canadian-Associationof-Refugee-Lawyers.pdf>.

8

The majority’s “Note on Remedial Discretion” (paras. 139-142) was not prompted by
argument advanced by the Appellant, Respondent or Amicus Curiae.
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disparate conceptions of the separation of powers and the administrative state. As
Cristie Ford remarks, the selection of standard of review manifests a reversion to a
pre-CUPE framework that foregrounds the primacy of disciplining the administrative state’s exercise of legal authority, and deferring only to the extent that
legislative intent requires it.9 The Court’s method for choosing the standard of
review re-asserts the existence of bright lines, stable categories and unambiguous
legislative intent, with a view to restoring certainty and predictability. The actual
choices about where to draw lines, which categories to reify and what ulterior intent
to divine from legislation, happen to point mainly in the direction of greater judicial
intervention.
But when the Court turns to articulating a methodology for applying deference,
it switches over to the “culture of justiﬁcation”. The term has become a rhetorical
touchstone for a vision of the modern administrative state as a holistic enterprise in
which all branches of government internalize a commitment to the rule of law, and
instantiate it by fulﬁlling their speciﬁc role in the advancement of a culture of
justiﬁcation. Within this model, the Court is not the sole guardian of the rule of law
because the principles of legality constitute all actors in the system, albeit in
differentiated ways. One means of taking administrative actors seriously as
“partners” in the rule of law enterprise is to engage deferentially with their
decisions.
2.

The Trouble with Expertise

Judges are not theorists, and it is unsurprising that theoretical incongruity lurks in
a judgment whose ambitious mission is to weave a practical roadmap out of a tangle
of jurisprudence. My interest here lies in pulling on one conspicuous thread from the
judgment as a means of isolating some practical implications of the majority’s
choices: expertise. The majority in Vavilov announces that, henceforth, expertise no
longer constitutes a reason for curial deference. The sole reason for deference is the
fact that the legislator delegated a set of tasks or functions to an emanation of the
executive. Contra the dictum of U.S. Appeals Court Judge Richard Posner,
deference is a birthright of administrative actors. They attract deference because
they exist — and because there is no statutory appeal from their decisions.
Recall that in the origin story that began with CUPE, the formal trigger for
deference was not expertise as such, but the presence of a privative clause. To be
sure, recognition of labour boards’ expertise (along with the fact of delegation and
ambiguity of texts) was vital to legitimating the reading that Dickson J. gave to the
privative clause, and to the broader aspiration of modernizing the relationship
between the judiciary and the administration. Fifteen years later, the Supreme Court
9

Cristie Ford, “Vavilov, Rule of Law Pluralism, and What Really Matters” (April 27,
2020), Paul Daly, Administrative Law Matters (blog), online: <https://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2020/04/27/vavilov-rule-of-law-pluralism-and-what-really-matters-cristieford/>.
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demoted statutory provisions about recourse to court as signal for deference, and
elevated expertise to a free-standing rationale. This happened over the course of a
few paragraphs in Pezim.10 First, the Court declared the presence or absence of a
privative clause “crucial” to determining legislative intent regarding standard of
review.11 A page later, the Court announced that “even where there is no privative
clause and where there is a statutory right of appeal, the concept of the specialization
of duties requires that deference be shown to decisions of specialized tribunals on
matters which fall squarely within the tribunal’s expertise”.12 The expertise
rationale for deference quickly expanded beyond the genus “specialized tribunals”
to encompass the entire administrative kingdom, and Canada v. Southam13
completed what Pezim began. Expertise in this context means knowledge and
competence speciﬁc to the sphere of operation of the administrative body.
Unfortunately, however, the Court could never articulate a means for identifying
the expertise of administrative actors relative to courts that was practical or
meaningful. The test for expertise was indeterminate, and the formal indicia lacked
correspondence to actual expertise anyway. This was probably inevitable. In much
the same way that courts use an objective standard of “reasonable apprehension of
bias” to avoid the harshness of ﬁnding actual bias, courts avoided awkward inquiries
into an actual decision-maker’s actual competence. But the common law contains a
rule against bias that courts enforce; the Court’s assessment of expertise is not
underwritten by a legal obligation on the state to adopt a merit-based system for
appointing or re-appointing unelected administrative actors — or even members of
quasi-judicial tribunals. The minority acknowledges that “concerns were expressed
about the quality of administrative decision making by interveners who represented
particularly vulnerable groups”, but blithely concludes that
The solution lies instead in ensuring the proper qualiﬁcations and training of
administrative decision-makers. Like courts, administrative actors are fully capable
of, and responsible for, improving the quality of their own decision-making
processes, thereby strengthening access to justice in the administrative justice
system.14

To whom do administrative actors owe this responsibility? Where will pressure to
ensure proper qualiﬁcations come from? Who can hold administrative bodies to
account? Certainly not vulnerable groups — they are not silent about qualiﬁcations,
10
Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] S.C.J. No. 58, [1994] 2
S.C.R. 557 (S.C.C.).
11

Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] S.C.J. No. 58, [1994] 2
S.C.R. 557, at 590 (S.C.C.).
12

Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] S.C.J. No. 58, [1994] 2
S.C.R. 557, at 591 (S.C.C.).
13

[1996] S.C.J. No. 116, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748 (S.C.C.).

14

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, [2019] S.C.J. No. 65,
2019 SCC 65, at para. 283 (S.C.C.).
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competence and bias, but they lack political inﬂuence. The Retired Judges Case15
stands as a rare exception to the Court’s unwillingness to address merit and
competence among administrative decision-makers as a rule of law issue, and is a
potential resource for future development. But in the meantime, the minority seems
willing to let vulnerable groups pay the price for an irrebuttable presumption of
expertise unless and until elected officials legislate merit-based criteria for appointment and re-appointment, and/or administrative bodies recognize and solve their
own shortcomings.
The divergence between the abstract expertise animating deference and the reality
for many administrative bodies, especially those serving marginalized populations,
grew more apparent once Dunsmuir imposed a presumption of deference in respect
of most decision-makers, and Newfoundland Nurses16 appeared to invite judges to
retroﬁt poorly motivated outcomes with legally acceptable reasons. Finally, in the
2016 judgment in Edmonton East, the majority simply deemed expertise to inhere
in administrative decision-makers:
However, as with judges, expertise is not a matter of the qualiﬁcations or
experience of any particular tribunal member. Rather, expertise is something that
inheres in a tribunal itself as an institution.17

The irrelevance of actual expertise (or its absence) came under particular strain in
the sphere of migration and citizenship. Consider Tran,18 decided shortly after
Edmonton East. Mr. Tran was a permanent resident ordered deported on account of
criminality. He had been convicted of a drug-related offence and received a
conditional sentence. At issue was whether a conditional sentence is a “term of
imprisonment” under section 36(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act.19 Counsel for Mr. Tran made extensive submissions on this question of
statutory interpretation to the Canada Border Services Agency officer tasked with
making a report on criminal inadmissibility. In his decision, the CBSA officer stated:
I have reviewed counsel’s submissions carefully and thoroughly, and given thought
to each relevant point. Many are legal arguments that do not fall into the scope of
my duties in this matter.20

It is one thing to ascribe expertise on an institutional rather than individual basis; it
15

CUPE v. Ontario (Minister of Labour), [2003] S.C.J. No. 28, 2003 SCC 29 (S.C.C.).

16

Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury
Board), [2011] S.C.J. No. 62, 2011 SCC 62 (S.C.C.).
17

Edmonton (City) v. Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd., [2016] S.C.J.
No. 47, 2016 SCC 47, at para. 33 (S.C.C.).
18
Tran v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), [2017] S.C.J. No. 50,
[2017] 2 S.C.R. 289 (S.C.C.).
19

S.C. 2001, c. 27.

20

Tran v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), [2017] S.C.J. No. 50,
[2017] 2 S.C.R. 289, at para. 14 (S.C.C.).
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is another to persist in the face of an individual decision-maker’s express disclaimer
of expertise. In its judgment, the Supreme Court refused to resolve the applicable
standard of review and remained mute about the decision-maker’s own declaration
of incompetence. The Court opted instead to dodge the problem by adopting the
“view that, under either standard of review, the assumed interpretation of section
36(1)(a) by the Minister’s delegate cannot stand”.21
A year later, in Vavilov, the Court was confronted with the same dilemma when
a delegate of the Registrar of Citizenship admitted that she lacked the skill to
interpret her home statute, the Citizenship Act.22 At issue was the interpretation of
section 3(2)(a) of the statute, which exempted from jus soli citizenship those persons
born on Canadian territory to diplomats, consular officials, or “other representative
or employee in Canada of a foreign government”. In the course of discovery, the
analyst was pressed to explain the research and reasoning that led to her conclusion
that Mr. Vavilov’s parents’ occupation (espionage) brought him within the exception. She ﬁnally replied as follows:
I went to ﬁnd the policy intent behind this section to determine or to ﬁnd out what
each particular concept and term meant and I did not ﬁnd that, and I’m not a lawyer
and I do not understand the signiﬁcance of the word “other” here, if that’s what
you’re trying to ask.23

Once again, the administrative actor conceded her own lack of expertise. The
Court does not include this quotation in the judgment, although it was drawn to their
attention. In a decision meant to serve as the prototype for standard of review
analysis going forward, grounding deference in a deemed expertise that is
demonstrably absent in the case at bar is not ideal. The Court can turn expertise into
a legal ﬁction — a proposition known to be partially or totally false, but recognized
for its utility — or it can dispense with expertise as a reason for deference. The
minority preferred the former, the majority the latter.
I have some sympathy for why the Court resiled from an irrebuttable presumption
of expertise. I do not believe the doctrine served vulnerable groups well in
enhancing access to justice, even as I would not wish to overstate its signiﬁcance.
One can also acknowledge the plausible inference that the presence of a statutory
appeal signals a legislative “choice of a more involved role for the courts in
supervising administrative decision making”.24 But the majority is not content to
simply abandon deemed expertise. It imputes to the legislator an intention that a
21

Tran v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), [2017] S.C.J. No. 50,
[2017] 2 S.C.R. 289, at para. 23 (S.C.C.).
22

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29.

23

Transcripts of Cross-Examination of Sophie-Marie Lamothe (October 15, 2015), at
15-17, 37, 40 (Respondent’s Record, Tab 7 at 114-16, 136, 139).
24

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, [2019] S.C.J. No. 65,
2019 SCC 65, at para. 46 (S.C.C.).
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court ignore expertise in the presence of a statutory appeal. In my view, the majority
overplays its hand by asserting ﬁrst that a statutory appeal provision trumps any
other legislative signal and next, that the use of the word “appeal” directs courts to
apply the same principles to an appeal from an administrative body as they would
apply to an appeal from a ﬁrst-level judicial decision.25 These were neither
necessary nor obvious inferences.
Perhaps the oddest feature of the Court’s reasoning is that it grows less persuasive
the more one reads. Reliance on mechanical canons of construction and the
suppression of alternative options gives one the sense that the majority is trying too
hard to present a contestable interpretive choice as self-evident. One prong of the
majority’s reasoning involves bootstrapping its own rejection of expertise.26
According to the majority, one virtue of jettisoning expertise as a rationale for
deference is that it clears the path for treating statutory appeals as a clear invitation
by the legislature to disregard the expertise of decision-makers subject to statutory
appeals. One might have thought the argument should run in the opposite direction,
namely, that the expertise of at least some decision-makers subject to statutory
appeal should count against reading statutory appeal as precluding any deference. In
any case, if Dunsmuir stood for the proposition that the presence of a statutory
appeal does not matter to the standard of review, Vavilov propounds that, when a
statutory appeal is present, nothing else matters. Both judgments commit to bright
lines in the name of clarity and simplicity, but draw the line in different places. I
agree with the minority’s rejoinder that the majority’s categorical exclusion of
statutory appeals from the scope of deference is unlikely to deliver on the promise
of simpliﬁcation.27
25

The majority imports the Housen v. Nikolaisen, [2002] S.C.J. No. 31, 2002 SCC 33
(S.C.C.) standard of correctness for errors of law, and “palpable and overriding error” for
everything else. For an explanation of why this is likely to lead to confusion, increased
litigation and perverse outcomes, see Paul Daly, “The Vavilov Framework and the Future of
Canadian Administrative Law” (January 15, 2020), online: SSRN <https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3519681>.
26

One might have expected the majority to leverage the fact that an appellate court enjoys
the superior remedial power of substituting an outcome on the merits, which courts on judicial
review typically do not. This could support a plausible argument that a court authorized to
substitute an outcome on the merits should be entitled to satisfy itself on the merits before
doing so. Whether, and to what extent, it should prevail over competing arguments is a
separate question. But since the majority also uses the Vavilov case to aggrandize the remedial
powers of courts on judicial review (enabling them to behave more like appellate courts more
frequently), the majority deprives itself of reliance on the remedial distinction between
judicial review and appeal.
27

Para. 251 (per Abella and Karakatsanis JJ.). For further explanation of why this is likely
to lead to confusion, increased litigation and perverse outcomes, see Paul Daly, “The Vavilov
Framework and the Future of Canadian Administrative Law” (January 15, 2020), online:
SSRN <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3519681 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3519681>.
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The dethroning of expertise as the chief rationale for deference allows the
majority to expand another exemption from deference. Drawing on Toronto (City)
v. CUPE, Local 79,28 the Court in Dunsmuir reserved a correctness standard of
review for “general questions of law of central importance to the legal system as a
whole and outside the adjudicator’s specialized area of expertise”. The Vavilov
majority eliminated the proviso of expertise. In principle, this should enlarge the
ambit of questions subject to non-deferential review. The practical impact is
unpredictable, however, because the Court proved very reluctant to deploy this
exception post-Dunsmuir, though not on account of the original decision-maker’s
expertise.
Thus far, the majority judgment tilts toward reducing the scope of deference by
widening opportunities for correctness review. I suspect that many judges, lawyers,
scholars and students did not anticipate the majority’s ruling on statutory appeals.
The demise of jurisdiction as a separate ground for correctness and the broadening
of the “question of law of central importance” exception were less surprising.
However, the majority resists the call to create an exception for a “legal question on
which there is persistent discord within an administrative body”.29 This is
noteworthy because the concern about inconsistency attracted more critical commentary over the years than did statutory appeals, and also because it would have
been easy enough to let expertise do negative work in rationalizing a correctness
standard for inconsistency, as the majority did for statutory appeals. Instead, the
majority’s stance on inconsistency was justiﬁed on “practical grounds, this Court’s
binding jurisprudence, and the hypothetical nature of the problem”.30
3.

Expertise, Reasoning and Enlightened Statutory Interpretation

Having reformed the test for standard of review, the Court turns to the issue that
vexed the legal community most since Dunsmuir, namely the methodology for
assessing the reasonableness of a decision. The majority transitions to this second
phase of the judgment via its discussion of reasons as a bridge between process and
substance. In its account of the functions and virtues of reason-giving,31 it pivots
away from the conservative, court-centric conception of the rule of law and invokes
the more recent “culture of justiﬁcation” approach that conceives of the rule of law
as a collaborative project that engages administrative actors as partners rather than
subordinates.
To oversimply, the majority’s approach to the choice of standard of review is
28

[2003] S.C.J. No. 64, 2003 SCC 63 (S.C.C.).

29

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, [2019] S.C.J. No. 65,
2019 SCC 65, at para. 72 (S.C.C.).
30

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, [2019] S.C.J. No. 65,
2019 SCC 65, at para. 72 (S.C.C.).
31
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, [2019] S.C.J. No. 65,
2019 SCC 65, at paras. 76-82 (S.C.C.).
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animated by respect for the legislator, not for the administrative decision-maker:
Courts defer only because they respect parliamentary supremacy, and only to the
extent required to give effect to legislative intent. And this majority discerns that the
legislator intends that courts defer only because of the fact of delegation (“institutional design choice”), and also that the legislator now intends curial deference to
apply in fewer instances.
The “culture of justiﬁcation” approach to deference does not disregard the
legislator, but it foregrounds respect for the decision-maker. Administrative actors
have expertise, experience and sometimes even legitimacy that a court might not
enjoy, and this assists in explaining both why courts should defer and how they
should defer. The Vavilov majority retains respect for the administrative actor in its
account of how to apply reasonableness. It endorses a judicial stance of “respectful
attention” to the reasons for decision offered by the decision-maker, and this respect
derives not simply from the fact of delegation but also from expertise.
At the same time, the majority attaches the word “robust” to its methodology, and
one wonders if this signals a not-quite-as-deferential deference. This would be
unsurprising. The fact of delegation is a thin thread upon which to hang deference.
Without any regard for the legislator’s motives for delegation (expertise is one,
though not the only, reason), delegation alone does not necessarily support strong
deference. Inevitably, the majority’s conservatism on selection of standard of review
seeps into the application discussion, even if the discursive framework for the latter
invokes the “culture of justiﬁcation”.32
The majority’s elaboration of a method for assessing reasonableness provides
fodder for those who suspect that it will quickly become indistinguishable from
“correctness” review, but also for those who believe that it will operate as a
distinctive form of review that is genuinely less interventionist. I do not think that
the judgment makes either outcome inevitable, nor would I expect uniformity in its
implementation. How Vavilov is operationalized depends vitally on the judicial
temperament of those who apply it, and the future modiﬁcations, correctives and
signals sent by the Supreme Court.
For present purposes, I will simply highlight the places and ways in which the
majority references expertise in its methodology, recognizing that a more comprehensive account of the judgment would require greater attention to countercurrents.
The majority reiterates that “the particular context of a decision constrains what will
be reasonable for an administrative decision maker to decide in a given case”.
Therefore, the question is how expertise ﬁgures into that context.
The majority assumes that most administrative decisions leading to judicial
review are subject to a duty to give reasons, and that those reasons will be the
primary resource for assessing reasonableness. In these situations, the majority has
32
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tacitly raised expectations on administrative bodies to ensure that decision-makers
possess a certain level of skill in reason-writing. This is distinct from the substantive
subject-matter expertise revealed in the reasons themselves. Recall that when the
Supreme Court introduced a common law duty to give reasons in Baker v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),33 the Court was sensitive to the burden
and loss of efficiency this would impose on decision-makers, and assured that
ﬂexibility in the requirements for reasons would minimize the cost to administrative
bodies. Indeed, the Court honoured this on the procedural side by effectively
imposing no formal requirements on what would count as fulﬁlling the duty to give
reasons.34
But two decades later, Vavilov emphasizes the importance of responsive reasons,
because “reasons are the primary mechanism by which decision makers demonstrate
that they have actually listened to the parties”.35 This means that decision-makers
must demonstrate competence in the mechanics of reason-giving. For example, a
failure to “meaningfully grapple with key issues or central arguments raised by the
parties”, or to explain departure from long-standing practice, precedent or guideline,
may cast doubt on the reasonableness of the decision.36 I do not object to imposing
these constraints on decision-makers, and making these expectations patent is a
virtue of the majority judgment. It will be important to watch whether courts
maintain this standard, because the capacity to deliver meaningful reasons is not a
skill that all decision-makers equally possess or can acquire.
When the majority turns to the subject-area expertise of decision-makers, it
defends the distinctive array of skills and resources that decision-makers bring to
their task:
[T]he concepts and language employed by administrative decision makers will
often be highly speciﬁc to their ﬁelds of experience and expertise, and this may
impact both the form and content of their reasons. These differences are not
necessarily a sign of an unreasonable decision – indeed, they may be indicative of
a decision maker’s strength within its particular and specialized domain.37

Expertise and specialized knowledge demonstrated through reasons will, according
to the majority, facilitate and validate deference:
Respectful attention to a decision maker’s demonstrated expertise may reveal to a
33
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reviewing court that an outcome that might be puzzling or counterintuitive on its
face nevertheless accords with the purposes and practical realities of the relevant
administrative regime and represents a reasonable approach given the consequences
and the operational impact of the decision.38

These seem like promising endorsements of deference from the majority. But it
is important to recognize that the majority’s respectful attention is directed at how
well administrative actors insert their expertise, experience and specialized knowledge into the methodology of the “modern principle of statutory interpretation”.
Critics of the majority might identify this as the place where reasonableness tips
over into correctness. That may yet turn out to be the case. But across the four
decades since CUPE, the Supreme Court declined to articulate a distinctively
deferential technique for interpreting a statutory provision. The majority does not
install the “modern principle” as the paradigm; it brings to the surface what was
always already there. Even where a court did not explicitly ﬁgure out the “correct”
answer and measure it against the outcome reached by the decision-makers, courts
either said very little about what made an interpretation reasonable, or they
measured reasonableness according to a set of judicially created tools — namely
text, context and purpose.
The operative question now emerges more clearly: how much respect will a court
show to administrative actors’ treatment of the “interplay of text, context and
purpose”?39 Again, the majority encourages receptiveness to the distinctive perspective of administrative decision-makers in relation to the speciﬁc method of
statutory interpretation:
The specialized expertise and experience of administrative decision makers may
sometimes lead them to rely, in interpreting a provision, on considerations that a
court would not have thought to employ but that actually enrich and elevate the
interpretive exercise.40

The majority’s version of deference, on its best reading, is what I would call
enlightened statutory interpretation. By this I mean an approach to statutory
interpretation that adheres to the “modern principle” but is genuinely receptive to
input beyond the usual techniques that courts use to discern text, context and
purpose. These may include operational implications, alignment with broader
statutory mandate, and so on. There is precedent in post-Dunsmuir judgments of the
Court for judicial openness, as well as resistance.41 I do not think the minority
38
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proposes a model for assessing the reasonableness that differs dramatically from the
majority in qualitative terms. Certainly, the minority dedicates more energy to
illustrating various circumstances where courts should restrain themselves in the
face of an apparent anomaly, omission or deviation, whereas the majority devotes
considerable text to listing indicia of unreasonableness. But the real divergence
between majority and minority — and probably the one that actually matters most
— is beyond the reach of doctrine. It is a matter of judicial disposition. The
minority’s commitment to a conception of the rule of law that embraces (rather than
concedes) deference seems to run deeper and stronger, whereas a current of
diffidence runs through the majority judgment.
At one point, the majority commends a presumption that “those who interpret the
law — whether courts or administrative decision-makers — will do so in a manner
consistent with [text, context and purpose]”.42 Yet, three paragraphs later, the
majority erupts into a decidedly disrespectful admonition:
The administrative decision maker’s task is to interpret the contested provision in
a manner consistent with the text, context and purpose, applying its particular
insight into the statutory scheme at issue. It cannot adopt an interpretation it knows
to be inferior — albeit plausible — merely because the interpretation in question
appears to be available and is expedient. The decision maker’s responsibility is to
discern meaning and legislative intent, not to “reverse-engineer” a desired
outcome.43

This is not a message crafted by a court that understands itself to be engaged with
administrative actors in a shared enterprise of advancing a culture of justiﬁcation.
This is a reprimand directed at a cunning decision-maker who chooses to play fast
and loose with the law in order to advance her own ends, and so must be policed by
a vigilant judiciary.
Conjuring a recalcitrant decision-maker who chooses an interpretation she knows
to be plausible but inferior is troubling, and not only because it weirdly imputes a
mens rea to an imaginary decision-maker. The more serious problem is that if
deference is to mean anything in relation to statutory interpretation, it must permit
for the possibility that text, context and purpose will not always point in the same
direction, and that administrative decision-makers may manage that challenge
differently than a court. Indeed, the frequency with which text, context and purpose
are incongruent is probably the basis of most statutory interpretation disputes. But
v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] S.C.J. No. 53, 2011 SCC 53 (S.C.C.); I discuss the
Supreme Court’s disparate treatment of the decision-maker’s statutory interpretation in the
two cases online: <https://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2018/12/14/audrey-macklinon-the-supreme-court-of-canadas-administrative-law-trilogy>.
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an adjective like “inferior” posits the existence of a “superior” interpretation, which
sits uncomfortably close to a “correct” interpretation. Is an “inferior” interpretation
one that tilts toward a meaning that aligns more closely with operational realities
and consequences than “plain meaning”, or vice versa? Does an “inferior”
interpretation prioritize consistency with a common law deﬁnition, over the severity
of the impact of a given interpretation on vulnerable people, or vice versa?
I reiterate here that one can ﬁnd several other statements by the majority that
exhort judges to work from the decision-maker’s reasons, to eschew launching into
their own interpretive exercise and, as described earlier, to recognize the beneﬁts
gleaned from interpretations informed by experience, expertise and specialized
knowledge. As I noted earlier, different passages in the majority judgment provide
cover for judges of varying dispositions toward deference.
IV. CONCLUSION
I am persuaded by the majority’s promotion of deference in the form of
“enlightened statutory interpretation” where pure questions of law are at issue. I am
convinced of the beneﬁts offered by expert, experienced administrative decisionmakers who can draw on their distinctive role, the breadth of their mandate, their
institutional resources and processes, and their informed assessment of the consequences of interpretive choice. I concur that their insights may be otherwise
inaccessible to generalist judges, and that these may “actually enrich and elevate the
interpretive exercise”.
If all that the majority tells us is true, the question becomes this: Why would
courts ever deny themselves the beneﬁts of this demonstrated expertise, since it
comes at the cost of impoverishing and diminishing the interpretive expertise? In
light of the opportunity to enhance the quality of judicial decision-making, one
would hope that a court would always want to fully engage with administrative
decision-makers’ reasoning process, even on appeal. Yet, the majority declines the
opportunity, by insisting that a statutory appeal provision communicates a resolute
rejection of deference from the legislator to courts.
One might counter that an appellate court can and should pay careful attention to
the reasoning process of the administrative body even under a correctness standard
of review. Indeed, the majority seems to acknowledge this:
When applying the correctness standard, the reviewing court may choose either to
uphold the administrative decision maker’s determination or to substitute its own
view . . .. While it should take the administrative decision maker’s reasoning into
account — and indeed, it may ﬁnd that reasoning persuasive and adopt it — the
reviewing court is ultimately empowered to come to its own conclusions on the
question.44

And this brings me back to my disappointment at the majority decision in Bell and
44
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NFL. Mary Liston trenchantly critiques the majority’s approach to interpreting the
relevant provision of the Broadcasting Act45 in that case. The majority settled
quickly on a correctness standard of review, and my reading of its judgment is that
it did not carefully consider the CRTC’s reasons, and did not situate them against the
CRTC’s broad policy mandate, its established reputation as an expert body, or the
three-year process of consultation and deliberation that preceded its Order. The
majority judgment is a dispiriting illustration of arid statutory interpretation,
whatever one’s view of the outcome. This seems especially unfortunate because
there is no obvious correlation between the expertise of a body and whether it is
subject to statutory appeal or judicial review. Indeed, many would think that the
CRTC is precisely the type of agency that warrants respect for its expertise. If Bell
and NFL proves typical of a correctness assessment that takes the “decision-maker’s
reasoning into account”, the space for generative engagement between the judiciary
and the administration will have shrunk and, along with it, the opportunity for richer,
more elevated interpretations of law across the public law spectrum. These are early
days, however. One hopes that lower courts will ﬁnd their way to practising
enlightened statutory interpretation on appeal as much as on judicial review simply
because it’s a better way for courts to do their job.
45

S.C. 1991, c. 11. See online: <https://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2020/
04/29/bell-is-the-tell-im-thinking-of-mary-liston/#search-box>.


264

